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Abstract 
Hannah Arendt is one of the few philosophers to examine the dynamics of political 
action at length. Intriguingly, she emphasises the disclosure of who the actor is as a 
specific distinction of political action. This emphasis is connected with some long-
standing worries about Arendt’s account that centre on its apparent unconcern for 
political responsibility. In this paper I argue that Arendt’s emphasis on disclosure 
actually harbours a profound concern with responsibility. I do so by examining three 
questions. The main part of the paper focuses on how disclosure is bound up with 
political actors’ attempts to act with one another. It asks: what would it be for an actor 
to evade disclosure? And: what is involved in an actor acknowledging the fact of 
disclosure? – Looking at the matter negatively, attempts to evade disclosure and its 
implications lead to irresponsibility. Positively, for the actor to accept disclosure is to 
see herself as bound to her fellow actors and audience by relations of joint action and 
mutual accountability. The conclusion asks a third question: what would it mean for on-
lookers to deny the relevance of actors’ disclosure? I argue that Arendt’s historiography 
– which revolves around stories in which political actors reveal who they are – reflects 
her conviction that people can and must take responsibility for their world. 
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Several worries about Arendt’s account of political action – above all, as expressed in 
her most extended theoretical treatment, The Human Condition – revolve around the 
topic of responsibility. Alongside long-standing concerns about her dismissal of ‘social’ 
concerns from politics, critics such as George Kateb, Seyla Benhabib and Hanna Pitkin 
have worried about her disavowal of means-end thinking, her reluctance to specify 
moral criteria for political judgment, and her emphasis on the disclosure of the actor.2 In 
various ways, these aspects of Arendt’s thought seem to cut against the obvious thought 
that responsible political actors should strive to achieve morally valuable ends. As Mary 
Dietz puts it, ‘without a substantive purpose, Arendt’s courageous political performer is 
constantly in danger of becoming only an actor, “concerned merely with the 
‘impression’ he makes”.’3 Related worries recur in simmering suspicions about the 
‘agonism’ or ‘aestheticism’ or ‘decisionism’ of Arendtian politics, its irrelevance to 
‘normal’ as opposed to ‘extraordinary’ politics, and her apparent celebration of ancient 
Greek politics, for all their elitism, violence and instability.4 
In this paper, I would like to address directly Arendt’s focus on disclosure and the 
worries about responsibility that it has generated. Of course, Arendt’s emphasis on 
disclosure has attracted persuasive defences, such as that of Jacques Taminiaux.5 And 
no reader of Arendt’s more overtly political texts can doubt that she was deeply 
concerned with problems of acting responsibly, just as her judgments of concrete 
instances of political irresponsibility pull no punches. Situating Arendt’s account of 
action alongside these texts and her broader political concerns is an important 
interpretative move, pursued by such distinguished authors as Margaret Canovan and 
Seyla Benhabib;6 and a similar move can be made as regards Arendt’s specific concern 
with the disclosure of individual persons, which, as David Marshall documents, 
originated in her reaction to ‘the homogenizing tendencies of modernity.’7 
Nonetheless, despite many persuasive readings and valuable contextualisations of The 
Human Condition’s account of action, I believe that commentators have not yet found a 
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satisfactory way of relating its focus on disclosure to political responsibility. One might 
conclude, perhaps, that these aspects of action sit in irresolvable tension.8 Certainly 
Arendt takes pains to stress the ‘frustrations’ of action, not least those posed by the 
unpredictable consequences of the actor’s self-disclosure as she interacts with others. 
But it would be more satisfying, I suggest, if we could show an integral connection 
between the actor’s self-disclosure and the responsibility for the world which, Arendt 
says, ‘arises out of action.’9 At any rate, to demonstrate such a connection is the task 
that I undertake in this paper. 
Beginning with the perspective of the actor herself, I first ask: What would it be for a 
political actor to refuse disclosure of her identity, or to try and make this disclosure 
irrelevant? The central thought I pursue is this: When someone attempts to evade 
disclosure or its implications, this inevitably has the effect of denying shared 
responsibility for political affairs, and thus leads to characteristic forms of 
irresponsibility. I then pose a second question: What is involved in the actor’s 
acknowledging and accepting the fact of disclosure? I suggest such acknowledgement 
lends us important clues about the spirit and principles of responsible political action. 
An actor who is prepared to appear before others relies on their judgments and hopes for 
their support, thus upholding the principle of shared responsibility for the world. I 
conclude by posing a third question: What would it mean, to deny that it matters that 
actors disclose themselves in the course of action? As part of her emphasis on 
disclosure, Arendt tells us that the ‘most original’ product of action is not the realisation 
of a particular goal or end, but rather a story. This may suggest an undue concern with 
the viewpoint and satisfactions of historical spectators. I offer an alternative way of 
looking at this claim, in order to underline the basic connection between disclosure and 
responsibility in Arendt’s thought.  
The process of disclosure and attempts to evade its ‘unreckonability’ 
Arendt claims that the disclosure of actors necessarily occurs in the process of action.10 
A person does not have or disclose a unique identity because he embodies some 
peculiar, non-repeated assemblage of qualities that we might simply enumerate. In 
Arendt’s terms, that would be to mistake the ‘what’ for the ‘who.’11 Nor does such a 
unique identity exist within the self, already there awaiting disclosure: in our inner lives, 
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Arendt sees multiplicity rather than identity – in Dana Villa’s words, ‘a self whose lack 
of appearance deprives it of both unity and reality.’12 Rather, a person has a unique 
identity because he is born into13 the human web of relationships in a unique place, and 
then charts – and suffers – a unique course through it, precisely by relating to others 
who relate to him in their turn. That is, a person’s identity is partly constituted by those 
relations and the (inter)actions by which he stakes his place in the world: ‘If there were 
no shared world [Mitwelt]… the person would be lacking.’14 Whether we think of 
private or public life, to say who someone is requires us to tell the story of his 
interactions and relations with others. And political action is always a matter of 
interaction: the meeting and crossing of different opinions and initiatives that precisely 
concern a ‘shared world.’15 
Arendt also emphasises that the concomitant disclosure of identities often makes action 
immensely frustrating: ‘the disclosure of the person inheres in all, even the most goal-
oriented, actions and has for the course of action decisive consequences that are 
predetermined neither by motives nor by goals.’16 The frustration arises because we do 
not know whom others will perceive when we act. While some reactions may be more 
or less predictable, or quickly emerge in the course of action, no actor can ever be sure 
what others have made or will make of her. Hence this process of on-going, mutual 
disclosure introduces an equivocal and unreckonable element into action. Insofar as we 
can truly say who someone is, this is by telling a story once the person’s life is 
complete17: a thread that is already fully woven into the web of human relationships, 
one that has uniquely affected every other life-thread that it has touched.18  
Despite these frustrations, Arendt insists: ‘Without the disclosure of the agent in the act, 
action loses its specific character… It is then indeed no less a means to an end than 
making is a means to produce an object.’19 She also suggests that some political actors 
welcome the disclosure of an identity that they themselves will never know – no reader 
can ignore her discussion of the ancient Greek understanding of action, with its ‘urge 
toward self-disclosure at the expense of all other factors.’20 For the most part, however, 
she admits that the disclosure of identities seems ‘of secondary importance,’ since 
action generally concerns ‘a demonstrable and worldly given.’21 Above all, she 
underlines how the unpredictable consequences of an unknowable disclosure frustrate 
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the actor who wishes to achieve a particular goal or, perhaps, control the identity that 
others attribute to him. 
As a first step in demonstrating how disclosure is related to responsibility, I want to 
consider the forms of irresponsibility that emerge when actors try to evade this 
frustration. In the remainder of this section, I will consider how action goes awry when 
actors try to control this disclosure. In the next section, I consider attempts to prevent its 
having unpredictable consequences. 
Arendt is clear that ‘no purpose in the world can have this identity freely at its 
disposal,’22 that ‘no human being can “shape” his life or create his life-story.’23 In The 
Human Condition, she mentions one way in which actors may try to escape this fact. 
Elsewhere, she considers two, rather more revealing ways: the attempt to convince the 
world of an image of oneself, and the attempt to live out a story already lived. 
The case mentioned in The Human Condition is Achilles’. To underline the 
unknowability of one’s identity, Arendt likens it to the Greek daimon, ‘looking over 
[someone’s] shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those he encounters.’24 But 
she suggests that a person may – exceptionally – succeed in the aim of bequeathing a 
particular identity by choosing ‘a short life and a premature death,’ thus withdrawing 
from the ‘consequences and continuation of what he began’ and foregoing ‘the 
continuity of living in which we disclose ourselves piecemeal.’25 As Vita Activa puts it, 
‘it is as if [Achilles] had dared to look over his own shoulder and set eyes on his 
daimon, and what he saw was courage personified.’26 Perhaps needless to add, his was 
an example of martial, rather than political, action and courage: in politics to choose 
premature death implies some form of martyrdom, which is meaningful only if one’s 
name is genuinely identified with a political cause or principle. 
Regarding more everyday cases of actors preoccupied with the identity they project, we 
may recall an observation of Mary McCarthy’s from Arendt’s notebooks: ‘those who 
seek to project an “image” are unaware of how they look. The truth they are revealing 
has become invisible to them.’27 As soon as we ‘see through’ an actor’s preoccupation 
with his image, he looks quite different to us – a play-actor rather than an actor. The 
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Origins of Totalitarianism gives a case in point: Disraeli’s naïve yet calculated 
projection of greatness and Jewish exoticism, in the cause less of political than social 
achievement. ‘He played the game of politics like an actor in a theatrical performance, 
except that he played his part so well that he was convinced by his own make-believe… 
This charlatan… acted the part of the Great Man with genuine naiveté and an 
overwhelming display of fantastic tricks and entertaining artistry.’28 Clearly this dual 
image of exoticism and greatness played with some success among his contemporaries 
(it garnered much suspicion, too). But however variously Disraeli’s story has 
subsequently been told, play-acting and irresponsibility are essential elements within it. 
The attempt to project an image, an abiding preoccupation with what others perceive, 
trips over itself. What it finally discloses is a merely instrumental attitude toward 
whatever worldly affairs the actor may interfere in – in short, vanity and 
irresponsibility. 
Following Arendt’s claim that identities are revealed in stories, an actor who tries to 
control who he discloses might pursue a third route: attempting to play a part already 
played before. To pretend to be an actor in a story whose end one already ‘knows’ and 
where each actor has his allotted part is one theme of On Revolution. It is, as Arendt 
bitingly puts it, how the men of the Russian revolution became the fools of history. 
After the French example, they knew that the revolution must end by eating its children, 
and played out their roles accordingly. Their folly was to act as ‘good revolutionaries’ 
by reenacting a known history: ‘It was the course of events, not the men of the [French] 
Revolution, which they imitated.’29 Our identities are indeed revealed in stories; but to 
encourage events to conform to some previous story is worlds away from the spirit of 
the original. It is bound to make for a new story – perhaps ‘farce’ rather than ‘tragedy’ 
in Marx’s famous words30 – and disclose quite different persons. Its irresponsibility is 
also clear: one no longer responds to persons and situations actually encountered, but 
instead to a preconceived narrative. 
The attempt to evade the consequences of disclosure by denying relatedness 
Arendt stresses the predicament of the actor who does not know who she discloses and 
hence cannot know what her audience will or should make of her. Let me turn, now, to 
another sort of irresponsible response to this frustration: not the endeavour to control 
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the identity we disclose, but rather the attempt to prevent this disclosure having 
consequences of its own. In doing this, Arendt contends that we will inevitably be led to 
substitute making for acting. That is, we fall into an irresponsible attempt to realise a 
preconceived end-product or state of affairs – to which the opposite is not pure 
performance or mere disclosure (as some critics, such as those I cited in my 
introduction, have worried), but rather acting with others in order to uphold or alter the 
terms on which we live together.31 
The basic reason for this stems from the fact that, in politics, we can only act in relation 
to others. Action is always a matter of relating, relating always involves appearing, and 
appearing is disclosing – no matter how concrete our intentions and goals. As such, 
there can be only one way to make the disclosure of my identity irrelevant to what I 
bring about: to make relationships irrelevant. The Human Condition tells us that ‘action 
can result in an end product only on condition that its own authentic, non-tangible, and 
always utterly fragile meaning is destroyed.’ That is rather vague, and Vita Activa 
clarifies. Action can do this ‘only when one is prepared to renounce what it can give rise 
to of itself – the objectively non-specifiable, non-tangible and always utterly fragile 
relationships between human beings.’32 
But what would it be to ‘renounce’ relationships and still be effective in the realm of 
human affairs? To make relationships irrelevant would be to set aside our entire 
apparatus of agreement, persuasion and joint action. This apparatus rests on our being 
connected by mutual commitments and common interests, by on-going responsiveness 
and answerability to others (thus the words ‘responsibility’ or, in German, 
‘Verantwortung’), by a shared sense of what we regard as important or desirable, by 
each party’s sense of whom she is dealing with and what relationships she stands in to 
them – in a word, by shared terms and common interests that permit on-going 
interaction and meaningful initiatives for change. 
Arendt gives an illuminating example of avoiding relatedness in Origins, in discussing 
the imperialists’ secretive rule by decree. Whether vain and of overweening ambition, 
like Cecil Rhodes, or retiring and relatively moderate like Lord Cromer, the imperialists 
came to embrace secrecy and bureaucracy, underwritten by overwhelming superiority in 
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the means of violence. This constituted a radical form of separation from ‘their’ 
subjects: 
Aloofness became the new attitude of all members of the British services; it was a 
more dangerous form of governing than despotism and arbitrariness because it did not 
even tolerate that last link between the despot and his subjects, which is formed by 
bribery and gifts… Integrity and aloofness were symbols for an absolute division of 
interests to the point where they are not even permitted to conflict… [They no longer] 
live in the same world… share the same goals, fight each other for possession of the 
same things…33 
As Arendt also comments, this separation was ‘the result of a responsibility that no man 
can bear for his fellow-man and no people for another people.’34 In other words, the 
refusal of relatedness and disclosure was bound up with the attempt to determine others’ 
fate from outside and on high. Cowed by force and debarred from all access to their 
rulers, the ‘subject peoples’ were denied any responsibility for their world. 
Obviously this is an extreme and historically specific example. A more limited and 
pretty much ubiquitous form consists in attempts to ‘pull the strings’ from ‘behind the 
scenes’ that politics has known since time immemorial.35 However well-intentioned and 
even indispensable such measures may occasionally be, the dangers of such refusals to 
‘show one’s hand’ – in Arendt’s terms, to appear and disclose oneself – are so familiar 
as to hardly need stating: mutual suspicion, incomprehension, and unaccountability. 
Matters are not much better for the actor, since she puts herself at risk of exposure and a 
concomitant loss of credibility and personal authority – hence the idea of ‘plausible 
deniability,’ so useful to those who would exercise powers without taking responsibility 
for their use. 
In Vita Activa, Arendt writes that the political actor who seeks to make an end-product 
will try to ensure that he and his followers ‘are no longer related in any moment of 
action.’36 He tries to change the world without relying on human relationships, because 
these would inevitably act back on and disrupt whatever end he had originally 
conceived. People who have no relations with us can have no reason to alter their 
conduct in line with our opinions, except insofar as things boil down to ‘the old carrot-
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and-stick approach.’37 If bribery and manipulation imply some bare minimum of 
relations, then violence stands out as the paradigm mode of action that eschews 
disclosure.38 
Apart from all moral reservations, irresponsibility arises here in the form of a systematic 
mistake about the enterprise one is engaged in. The attempt to overcome the frustrations 
of relating and disclosing by making relationships irrelevant can never fully succeed. 
This is because the effective wielding of violence still relies on joint action in the form 
of a power base – usually, as Arendt reminds us in ‘On Violence,’ an army or police 
force.39 Hence Arendt’s repeated insistence that those who make rulership possible do 
not merely obey, they support. They empower the ruler and effectively act with her; 
ruler and supporters remain very much ‘related in action.’ Inevitably, then, the actor 
never fully evades the frustrations that arise from the fact that others have their own 
wills and opinions, which are affected by their responses to her, that is, to the identity 
she discloses in a way that necessarily exceeds her grasp. Nonetheless, by organised 
violence and domination it is possible to limit action to an ever-smaller group and 
render others more or less powerless. This is the irresponsibility of depriving those 
persons of possible responsibility for their fates and, by the same token, rejecting any 
accountability to them. In other words, it is a denial that politics involves taking shared 
responsibility for the world. 
Disclosure as a clue to the nature of responsible action  
I have pointed to some ways in which political actors might seek to evade the 
frustrations bound up with self-disclosure – either by attempting to project a pre-
conceived identity, or by attempting to change the world while remaining unrelated to 
others. In both cases, this is bound up with forms of irresponsibility. The actor who is 
determined to preserve an image or live out a story has put self before world; the tyrant 
or imperialist attempts to impose a fate upon others and refuses any responsibility to 
them, just as the manipulator does on a much smaller scale. 
What I would like to consider, now, is how the fact that relating always involves 
disclosing can provide us with some positive clues to the nature of political 
responsibility. It will not tell us much about the goals that responsible political actors 
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should pursue. Except at the broadest level – for example, in her concern for lasting 
institutions that grant people civic status and ‘house’ political action40 – Arendt regards 
these as a matter for political debate and not for philosophical legislation. Indeed, she 
treats philosophical prescriptions as positively dangerous, insofar as they tend to float 
free from the questions of practical judgment that face political actors who – whatever 
their opinions as to how the world should be – must act within a pre-existing and no 
doubt ‘non-ideal’ constellation.41 In other words, Arendt’s perspective – unlike that of 
more prescriptive political theorists – is bound to the problems of assuming 
responsibility for the world, here and now.42 To assume such responsibility does not, of 
course, mean accepting the world as it is; but it does mean accepting that it is this world 
that must be altered or conserved, and so here one must start. As Arendt puts it,  
every generation, by virtue of being born into a historical continuum, is burdened by 
the sins of the fathers as it is blessed with the deeds of the ancestors. Whoever takes 
upon himself political responsibility will always come to the point where he says with 
Hamlet: “The time is out of joint: O cursed spite / That ever I was born to set it 
right!”43 
My contention is that Arendt’s concern with the position of those actors – and in 
particular, the fact that they disclose themselves in acting with others – can help us 
appreciate how ‘responsibility for the world… arises out of action.’44 Put simply, to 
acknowledge the fact of disclosure is to “stand up and be counted”: without abandoning 
the attempt to change others’ minds, to prevail over other opinions, and to change the 
world, the actor remains bound to his audience and fellow actors – and hence to the 
world that they share, preserve and change through their interaction.45 
Let me begin with the following note from Arendt’s Denktagebuch: 
Every actor wishes that people will follow him. The deed is always also an example. 
Political thought and judgment is exemplary (Kant), because acting is. Responsibility 
means, in its essence: to know that one sets an example, that others will “follow”; in 
this way one changes the world.46 
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There is a familiar refrain in the Arendt literature, largely based on her Kant lectures, 
that exemplars are crucial to the judgment of the political and historical spectator (just 
as they were to Arendt’s writings).47 One thing already interesting about this note is its 
concern with the judgment of the actor: the political actor is asked to appreciate that she 
‘sets an example.’48 Moreover, this is the essence of responsibility. 
But what might it mean to ‘know one sets an example,’ that others might “follow”? As 
we have seen, no actor can know just what example she sets: what, or rather who, that is 
will be judged and told by others. But this does not mean that how one appears is 
irrelevant to the actor. Acknowledging that an actor concerned only with her image 
must finally appear as a play-actor, it is still quite reasonable to wonder: Just what 
should we make of a political actor who were not concerned with how she appears to 
others? 
In the first place, Arendt highlights a self-reflective dimension to the responsible actor’s 
concern for appearances. In her notebooks, she points to the moral and political 
importance of imagining how one’s deed will appear: 
Don’t do unto others what you don’t want to be done to yourself. It is an appeal to the 
imagination: Imagine before doing to others that your doing would be done by others 
to yourself. Id est: Objectify – look at it from the outside with reference to you. / One 
could also say, perhaps with greater justification: Before doing imagine how it will 
look to you after you’ve done it.49 
Or recall the maxim that Arendt approvingly attributes to Machiavelli, “Appear as you 
may wish to be.”50 This refers the actor both to others’ possible perceptions and to 
actual examples of conduct: ‘When I make such a decision [as in “Appear as you wish 
to be”]… I am making an act of deliberate choice among the various potentialities of 
conduct with which the world has presented me.’51 Our imagination takes its bearings 
both from others’ perspectives and from previous examples that we wish to emulate or 
excel in some way.52 
Second, and less subjectively: An actor who were unconcerned with her appearance 
before others would show an unjustified confidence in herself, and by implication a 
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mistrust of her interactors and audience. If they are not deemed fit to offer judgments 
that might alter the actor’s own, then how can they be fit to act as partners and 
deliberators, fit to “follow” in any sense beyond the mere following of orders? In her 
famous interview with Günter Gaus, Arendt says: ‘this venture [into the public realm] is 
only possible where there is trust in people. A trust – which is difficult to formulate but 
fundamental – in what is human in all people. Otherwise such a venture could not be 
made.’53 Although these words do not correspond to anything she says in The Human 
Condition,54 I believe they express one of the anchor-points of all her thinking about 
action and appearance. Without giving up the intention to act on one’s own account, we 
must trust others’ ability to judge whether our example counts as good company55 or a 
cautionary tale, and to decide whether they will act in concert with us, whether they will 
“follow” or not. As Leslie Paul Thiele has argued, this means that Arendtian action has 
the character of an invitation.56 To put the point rather paradoxically, in conditions of 
non-domination, a stance of trust and solicitation is forced upon every actor, at least to 
some degree. However much she may try to evade this, by cunning or even ruthlessness 
in the games of power, each actor remains dependent on others’ more or less willing 
cooperation. To take account of their actual and imagined judgments is to accept the 
basic conditions of action in concert, and of shared responsibility for political affairs. 
This leads to a third point. Willing appearance before others and concern for their 
judgments are elementary conditions of responsibility. They bind together the forward-
looking sense involved in acting so as to take responsibility for the world with the 
backward-looking sense of accepting that one will be judged responsible for one’s 
deeds. On the one hand, the actor steps into the public realm in order to take a stand on 
matters that can only be addressed with others and that are relevant to many others. On 
the other, a person can only answer for her deeds to the extent that her conduct is not 
hidden but seen by others, and is acknowledged as owing to her own initiative, rather 
than mere submission to authority or inevitability. (As Roy Tsao notes, Arendt was only 
too aware how the excuses of many collaborators in political evil – ‘I was only 
following orders,’ ‘Anyone else would have done the same’… – constitute denials or 
evasions of agency.57) A person has reason to answer for her deeds insofar as she sees 
them as contributions to a world shared with others, who thereby have a valid stake in 
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what she does and – as the actor must hope – reason to judge her favourably and support 
her initiatives. 
To ‘know that one sets an example’ does not, then, require one to know what example 
one sets, though it surely demands imagination and judgment of prior examples. Rather, 
it demands recognition that one will indeed be judged by others, as an actor in one’s 
own right. By virtue of not knowing whom one discloses, the actor is beholden to others 
– who, seeing the world from their distinct perspectives, may act and respond on their 
own accounts. As Steve Buckler puts it, ‘it is in the nature of that very desire [for public 
approbation or glory], that… people must acknowledge and subject themselves to the 
judgment of a community of spectators [who may also be actors], of which they too are 
members.’58 Subjectively, there may be a great deal of immodesty in the pursuit of 
political power and reputation. Objectively, like all ventures that depend on an 
audience’s consent, it involves a counter-intuitive humility and on-going accountability. 
Conclusion: telling stories about action 
Arendt places the revelatory potential of human action and relationships at the centre of 
her thinking. One reason for this is already apparent from her treatment of 
totalitarianism. Twentieth century political events and ideologies made devastatingly 
clear that to think of human beings as ‘more or less successful repetition[s] of the same’ 
is to render millions upon millions of people ‘superfluous.’59 From this perspective, it 
does not help much to insist on the familiar theme that each person is an end-in-herself. 
Because this concept omits the absolute Einmaligkeit (uniqueness, literally ‘one-time-
ness’) of each person, it cannot answer the nihilistic question: why one more or less 
person in the world? For Arendt, each person’s novelty and uniqueness is made 
manifest as she charts a course through the web of human relationships. Origins of 
Totalitarianism insists on the fundamental prescription that follows from this, that each 
person be accorded the right ‘to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s 
actions and opinions.’60 As I have emphasised, this implies a corresponding imperative: 
to act in the acknowledgement that a story may be told of one – and judged by others. 
Arendt’s emphasis on disclosure in political action corresponds to the special urgency 
that this imperative holds in the public realm – where we no longer move in relatively 
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confined circles of family or social life or workplace; where we directly encounter a 
world made up of many others, each acting and responding on the basis of how things 
and persons appear to him or her; and, above all, where we experience the possibility of 
changing, renewing, and taking responsibility for the world we share.61 Such 
responsibility depends, as I have tried to show, on the awareness that one can only do 
this in concert with others. To acknowledge the fact of disclosure is to accept that one 
acts on one’s own account in a story whose end one does not know; that it is for others 
to judge what example one sets, whether one’s cause is worthy and whether one serves 
it well; and that political outcomes be determined, not by cloak or dagger, but by our 
willing and witting responses to one another’s initiatives. Arendt’s self-disclosing 
political actor is bound to the very conditions of joint action: responsiveness to a world 
shared with others, relationships with fellow actors, and reliance on their responses to 
her actions and herself. 
To conclude, I would like to point out how intimately this relates to Arendt’s view of 
history. Like her account of action, this courts the suspicion of irresponsibility; 
nonetheless, it has human responsibility at its core. Arendt’s historiography emphasises 
story-telling, which can seem like an aesthetic preference that neglects more objective 
factors.62 Having asked what it might mean for an actor to deny or evade her self-
disclosure in the course of action, however, we might also ask a parallel, historical 
question: What would it mean to deny that it matters, that people have disclosed 
themselves in the course of actions and events? – There seem to be two, not altogether 
unfamiliar lines of thought that might involve such a denial. One is the belief that all 
that matters is what has been achieved or bequeathed. Alternatively, we might deny that 
identities matter, in the belief that history is not made by individual human beings 
anyhow. 
The first position claims that, not actors or actions, but events and end-products are 
what remain salient: political actors are, if you like, mere means to whatever they leave 
behind. A basic problem with this line of thought is that no political achievement ever 
lasts unless people continue to act so as to uphold it: a law, a constitution, a parliament, 
any other political reality – all endure only insofar as people act in their terms. As 
Arendt expresses the point in ‘What is Freedom?’: 
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Political institutions, no matter how well or badly designed, depend for continued 
existence upon acting men… Independent existence marks the work of art as a 
product of making; utter dependence upon further acts to keep it in existence marks 
the state as a product of action.63 
No doubt, acts of foundation differ from those of conservation or augmentation.64 
Nonetheless, to focus only on some ‘achievement’ is to treat the very essence of 
political life as merely incidental. To leave action and actors out of account is to ignore 
how any political outcome can be secured and upheld. 
The second position denies even more baldly that human beings are able to take 
responsibility for their world. Despite ‘the impossibility of ever making an individual 
responsible for what results [from action],’65 Arendt refuses to ‘despair of all possible 
human responsibility’66 and view history as the product of anonymous forces and 
processes, rather than of human action and initiative. To insist that human beings reveal 
themselves in the course of action or (equivalently) that action always has authors, and 
to insist that this revelation matters or (equivalently) that the actor bears a specific 
dignity that exceeds whatever effects or achievements he leaves behind, may seem like 
an aesthetic predilection or comforting delusion – as if Arendt merely ‘preferred’ stories 
of human initiative to those of complex social, economic and other processes that 
actually determine people’s fates.67 
In the first place, Arendt certainly does not deny that those processes are real and must 
be understood and acknowledged: their terrifying force is a theme of The Human 
Condition as much as Origins of Totalitarianism. More than this, however, I think we 
should understand her approach as a call to responsibility. Arendt’s fundamental 
conviction is that unless people act together – above all, to found, augment and renew 
lasting political institutions – human power ceases to reach into the future, so that 
people are left helpless in the face of social and economic processes and whatever 
political movements may gain sway by merely cleaving to them. Whether political 
actors aim to conserve or change their situation, they always inherit a starting point 
which is the condition of all they do and which they can deny only at the cost of wishful 
thinking – yet another form of irresponsibility.68 In these conditions, no political actor 
ever achieves exactly what she sets out to achieve, nor does any group, however 
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concerted their action. What they may do, though – and what each attempts to do, in 
standing up before others for her idea of how the world should be – is take some 
responsibility for the world and resist the ‘ruin’69 (as Arendt says, courting the suspicion 
of poetry rather than prose) that such processes and forces must spell. 
Historical forces – not to mention our sheer mortality – do indeed spell ruin, for the 
simple reason that no political achievement remains alive without further initiatives to 
uphold and renew it. Hence our understanding of how we can take shared responsibility 
for anything politically worthwhile always depends on our telling and retelling of 
stories of action in the world, both as cautions and exemplars.70 Far from being 
‘peripheral side-effects,’ these stories really are, as Arendt says, ‘the most original 
product of action.’71 As such, and as so much political speech testifies, stories can be 
highly potent in politics – no less so, sadly, when they are distorted by wish or fear or 
resentment, or by ideological and theoretical preconceptions. Arendt draws both 
political and theoretical lessons from this power. Politically, Origins of Totalitarianism 
gathers many cautionary tales of failures to take responsibility; On Revolution tells 
stories of action in concert while lamenting subsequent failures to remember and (thus) 
to understand and renew. Theoretically, The Human Condition elevates action and the 
narratives that preserve it to a central place within political philosophy, facing down the 
perennial philosophical temptation to focus upon ideals and asking instead how we can 
take responsibility for the world – and who it is who does so. 
Reprising his earlier concerns about Arendt’s account, George Kateb has recently 
argued that for Arendt, ‘morality often ends up either subordinate in importance to 
existential values or sidelined by them… The[se] existential values [are]… human 
status and human stature. Human dignity for Arendt rests on human uniqueness, the 
human difference from the rest of nature.’72 But splitting the ‘existential’ off from the 
‘moral’ is misleading: people disclose their uniqueness and stature in many activities; 
politics has a moral claim to the first rank of those activities, because it is here that 
people deliberately attempt to take responsibility for how things go in a world of shared 
institutions and entwined fates – a prerogative that indeed separates human beings ‘from 
the rest of nature.’73 Hence stories of how they do this have a unique importance. In a 
few glorious cases we may recall stories of action in the hope of repeating the actors’ 
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achievements or keeping them alive, or revivifying a defeated cause that we believe 
should have been victorious. In many others, we may judge actors to have been 
mistaken or even quixotic in their efforts. But even in such cases – at least insofar as 
they avoid the extremes of irresponsibility that cut people off from their fellow actors 
and a shared world – action still discloses a doer and her will to responsibility, and 
thereby exhibits a dignity of its own. 
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